Archive for the ‘China’ Category

Desbalanceada: A Codependência da América e da China

setembro 7, 2015

A mais nova newsletter da Creativante, intitulada “Desbalanceada: A Codependência da América e da China“, já está no ar, e você pode acessá-la aqui, ou em: Boa leitura!

Ásia: impressões preliminares (I)

outubro 15, 2012

Já está no ar a mais nova newsletter da Creativante, cujo título é “Ásia: impressões preliminares (I)“, e que você pode acessar aqui!

Trata-se das primeiras impressões deste editor sobre sua viagem à China e à Coréia do Sul. Esperamos que tal relato seja oportuno!


Economic history of China and other major powers

junho 24, 2012

Do blog do prof. Mark Perry (!

Por que pouco sabemos das razões da China e da India já terem sido super powers? Eis aí um desvio no aprendizado de história econômica “eurocêntrico” que tivemos!

Click to enlarge.

China racing to expand data center capacity

dezembro 29, 2011
Do blog!

China racing to expand data center capacity

December 29, 2011

Source: Network World

China is building dozens, maybe hundreds of large data centers and vast “cloud cities” — industrial zones that aim to provide the foundations to support as many as 20 data centers — to support the needs of its fast-growing online population, estimated now at close to 500 million.

The data centers will help to meet escalating demand from telecom providers, and for services such as e-commerce, online banking and e-government, and will also provide computing infrastructure for overseas firms looking to expand in China.

The boom is providing opportunities for outside firms such as Hewlett-Packard and IBM. “We have more people in China focused on data center development and strategy than, I believe, in any country in the world,” said Rick Einhorn, worldwide director for HP’s Critical Facilities Services group.

Some are skeptical that companies will pick China as a base for providing IT services internationally. “There are questions around ownership rights for data and other assets,” said IDC analyst Michelle Bailey.

A former security consultant who worked on data center projects in China said foreign companies have three main areas of risk: local employees absconding with data, traffic being monitored or interfered with, and the loss of equipment during sudden “inspections” by Chinese police.

America and China: Is China a currency manipulator?

outubro 12, 2011

Está cada vez mais complicado entender a economia mundial.  Vejam esta notícia de The Economist ( Quero ver se o Ministro da Fazenda do Brasil vai chamar isto de “guerra cambial”!


America and China: Is China a currency manipulator?

Oct 11th 2011, 14:17 by The Economist online

The yuan/dollar exchange rate and America’s trade deficit with China

ON OCTOBER 11th the Senate is due to vote on a bill that would lead to sanctions being taken against countries whose currencies are “misaligned”. One currency in particular—the yuan—is on the minds of legislators.  But as the chart below suggests, the recent relationship between China’s currency and America’s trade deficit with China is not what China hawks in the Senate think it is. Rather than a cheap yuan leading to a flood of Chinese imports, the yuan has actually strengthened as the deficit has widened. There are many things American companies dislike about the way business is done in China: intellectual-property theft, the impossibility of winning government contracts, baffling rules on corporate ownership and so on. However the place for fixing these things is the World Trade Organisation, not Congress. President Obama’s administration has already passed on two opportunities to label China a currency manipulator, out of a well-founded fear of sparking a trade war. Senators should do the same (while hoping that China responds to their sabre-rattling by letting the yuan rise a little more, as happened the last time the Senate came close to passing a similar measure, in 2005).

U.S. Exports to China Grew 4 Times Faster Than Exports to the Rest of the World from 2000 to 2010

agosto 30, 2011

Mais um post sobre a relação comercial USA e China (post de ontem do blog do Prof. Mark Perry:!


U.S. Exports to China Grew 4 Times Faster Than Exports to the Rest of the World from 2000 to 2010


We hear a lot about Chinese exports to the U.S., but we don’t hear as much about U.S. exports to China.  Here are some facts from the U.S.-China Business Council:

China is the third largest export market for the United States ($92 billion in 2010), behind our NAFTA partners #1 Canada ($248 billion) and #2 Mexico ($163 billion), and head of #4 Japan ($60.5 billion) and #5 U.K. ($48.5 billion).

Our top five exports to China in 2010 were: Computers and electronics ($15.3 billion), farm products ($13.8 billion), chemicals ($11.8 billion), transportation equipment ($10.6 billion) and machinery ($9.3 billion).  Except for farm production, the other top four export categories are all  American manufactured products with the “Made in the U.S.A.” label.

Over the last decade from 2000 to 2010, U.S. exports to China grew by 468%, which was more than 8 times the 55.7% growth in exports to the rest of the world (see chart above of indexes for both series that are equal to 100 in the year 2000).  On an annual basis, exports to China have been growing at an average rate of 19% over the last decade, more than four times faster than the 4.5% annual growth rate for exports to the rest of the world.

U.S. Consumers Spend < 2% on "Made in China"

agosto 12, 2011

Novo post interessante do Prof. Mark Perry ( no dia 09/08!


U.S. Consumers Spend < 2% on “Made in China”


A new paper from the San Francisco Fed “The U.S. Content of ‘Made in China’” has been getting a lot of blog attention, see Matt Yglesias, Doug Henwood and Tim Fernholz (HTs to Steve Bartin and Jonah Goldberg).  One of the main points of the article is:

“Whereas goods labeled “Made in China” make up 2.7% of U.S. consumer spending, only 1.2% actually reflects the cost of the imported goods. Thus, on average, of every dollar spent on an item labeled “Made in China,” 55 cents go for services produced in the United States. In other words, the U.S. content of “Made in China” is about 55%.”

Expressed in dollar amounts, that means that of the $276 billion spent by consumers in 2010 on goods “Made in China” (or 2.7% of total consumer spending of $10,245 billion), only about $123 billion (0r 1.2% of consumer spending) reflects the contribution of Chinese content, and the other $153 billion (or 1.5% of consumer spending) actually goes to American companies and workers for value added in the U.S. from transportation, distribution, marketing, wholesale and retail activities.

For those goods “Made in the USA” with parts imported from China, the contribution of the Chinese content represents only 0.7% of total consumer spending.

Bottom Line: 

1. The total share of U.S. consumer spending on: a) “Made in China” imports (1.2%, see chart) plus b) the value of Chinese inputs used to produce goods labelled “Made in the USA” (0.7%, see chart) together represents less than 2% (1.9%) of personal consumption expenditures (or $194.65 billion out of $10,245 billion).

2. The SF Fed concludes that because the “share of consumer spending attributable to imports from China is less than 2%, it is unlikely that recent increases in labor costs and inflation in China will generate broad-based inflationary pressures in the United States.”

3. Doug Henwood adds that “it’s also an antidote to the widespread belief that the U.S. is hollowed out and all the action is in China.”

China’s High-tech Exports: Myth and Reality

julho 29, 2011

Continuando nossa discussão iniciada no post anterior de que a China talvez não seja um centro de inovação, eis aqui mais uma evidência de que a China oferece mais mitos do que realidade.

Desta feita apresentamos um artigo muito interessante do National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies do Japão, escrito por  Yuqing Xing .

O paper pode ser baixado aqui e o abstract segue abaixo!



China’s leading position in high-tech exports is a myth created by outdated trade statistics, which are inconsistent with the trade based on global supply chains. Assembled high-tech products, made with imported key parts and components, accounted for 82% of China’s high-tech exports. Current trade statistics mistakenly credit entire values of these assembled products to China, thus greatly inflate the export value. For instance, in 2009 China’s export in the iPhone amounted US$4.6 billion, of which only 3.6% was the value added by Chinese workers; its annual export in laptop PC valued at US$52 billion, but assembly accounted for only 3% of the gross value. In addition, 83% of China’s high-tech exports was attributed to foreign invested firms, in particular Taiwanese owned companies. Taiwan-IT companies have relocated 95% of their production/assembly capacity into and transferred mainland China to a top assembler of information and communication technology, such as laptop PCs, digital cameras and all i-products.

China as an Innovation Center? Not So Fast

julho 28, 2011

Excelente artigo que saiu hoje em The Wall Street Journal sobre a China!



JULY 28, 2011

China as an Innovation Center? Not So Fast

An impressive volume of patent filings conceals serious challenges to Beijing’s R&D aspirations.

Hardly a week goes by without a headline pronouncing that China is about to overtake the U.S. and other advanced economies in the innovation game. Patent filings are up, China is exporting high-tech goods, the West is doomed. Or so goes the story line.

The reality is very different. China is indeed mounting considerable efforts on the innovation front. However, many of the pundits seem to confuse inputs with outputs.

The “inputs” for innovation are impressive. China’s R&D expenditure increased to 1.5% of GDP in 2010 from 1.1% in 2002, and should reach 2.5% by 2020. Its share of the world’s total R&D expenditure grew to 12.3% in 2010 from 5.0% in 2002, placing it second only to the U.S., whose share remained steady at 34-35%. According to UNESCO, China now employs more people in science and technology research than any other country.

At first blush, data on “outputs” also look impressive. According to the World Intellectual Property Organization, Chinese inventors filed 203,481 patent applications in 2008. That would make China the third most innovative country after Japan (502,054 filings) and the U.S. (400,769).

Yet there’s less here than meets the eye. Over 95% of the Chinese applications were filed domestically with the State Intellectual Property Office. The vast majority cover Chinese “innovations” that make only tiny changes on existing designs. In many other cases, a Chinese filer “patents” a foreign invention in China with the goal of suing the foreign inventor for “infringement” in a Chinese legal system that doesn’t recognize foreign patents.

A better measure is to look at those innovations that are recognized outside China—at patent filings or grants to China-origin inventions by the world’s leading patent offices, the U.S., the EU and Japan. On this score, China is way behind the others.

Getty Images/Huntstock

The most compelling evidence is the count of “triadic” patent filings or grants, where an application is filed with or patent granted by all three offices for the same innovation. According to the OECD, in 2008, the most recent year for which data are available, there were only 473 triadic patent filings from China versus 14,399 from the U.S., 14,525 from Europe, and 13,446 from Japan. Data for patent grants in 2010 by individual offices paint a virtually identical picture.

Starkly put, in 2010, China accounted for 20% of the world’s population, 9% of the world’s GDP, 12% of the world’s R&D expenditure, but only 1% of the patent filings with or patents granted by any of the leading patent offices outside China. Further, half of the China-origin patents were granted to subsidiaries of foreign multinationals.

Why is there such a big gap between innovation inputs and outputs? Partly it may simply be a matter of time. Innovation requires not just new efforts but also a rich stock of prior knowledge. As new players on the technology frontier, Chinese organizations will need several years to build the requisite stock of knowledge.

But other factors are also at work. For instance, processes for allocating government funds for R&D projects remain highly politicized and inefficient. Policy makers have a strong penchant for megaprojects backed by individual ministries and give R&D grants based largely on political clout and connections rather than scientific peer review.

As Yigong Shi and Yi Rao, deans of Life Sciences at Tsinghua and Peking Universities respectively, observed in a recent editorial in Science magazine, for grants ranging from tens to hundreds of millions of yuan, “it is an open secret that doing good research is not as important as schmoozing with powerful bureaucrats and their favorite experts.. . . . China’s current research culture . . . wastes resources, corrupts the spirit, and stymies innovation.”

China’s research culture also suffers heavily from a focus on quantity over quality and the use of local rather than international standards to assess and reward research productivity. The result is a pandemic of not just incrementalism but also academic dishonesty. A 2009 survey by the China Association for Science and Technology reported that half of the 30,078 respondents knew at least one colleague who had committed academic fraud. Such a culture inhibits serious inquiry and wastes resources.

China’s educational system is another serious challenge because it emphasizes rote learning rather than creative problem solving. When Microsoft opened its second-largest research lab (after Redmond, Wash.) in Beijing, it realized that while the graduates it hired were brilliant, they were too passive when it came to research inquiry. The research directors attacked this problem by effectively requiring each new hire to come up with a project he or she wanted to work on. Microsoft’s approach is more the exception than the rule among R&D labs in China, which tend to be more top-down.

Yes, China is making rapid strides in some areas such as telecommunications technology. However, on an across-the-board basis, it still has quite some distance to cover before becoming a global innovation power.

Mr. Gupta is the Michael D. Dingman Chair in Strategy and Entrepreneurship at the Smith School of Business, The University of Maryland and a Visiting Professor in Strategy at INSEAD. Ms. Wang is managing partner of the China India Institute. They are the co-authors of “Getting China and India Right”(Wiley, 2009).

The Global Economy´s Shifting Centre of Gravity

março 22, 2011

O Prof. Danny Quah, do Economics Department da London School of Economics and Political Science and LSE Governance, está com um novo paper na praça. Ele se intitula “The Global Economy´s Shifting Centre of Gravity”.

Como mostra o Prof. Quah, o centro econômico de gravidade do planeta está se deslocando, e, pelas suas projeções estará entre a India e a China lá pelos anos 2050!  Quem viver verá!

Eis o resumo do paper, que você pode baixar aqui!

This article describes the dynamics of the global economy’s centre of gravity, the average location of economic
activity across geographies on Earth. The calculations here take into account all the GDP produced on this planet. The article finds that in 1980 the global economy’s centre of gravity was mid-Atlantic. By 2008, from the continuing rise of China and the rest of East Asia, that centre of gravity had drifted to a location east of Helsinki and Bucharest.
Extrapolating growth in almost 700 locations across Earth, this article projects the world’s economic centre of gravity to locate by 2050 literally between India and China. Observed from Earth’s surface, that economic centre of gravity will shift from its 1980 location 9,300 km or 1.5 times the radius of the planet.

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