Archive for fevereiro \28\UTC 2011

PWC- PricewaterhouseCoopers` 14th Annual Global CEO Survey

fevereiro 28, 2011

Saiu a nova pesquisa da PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP sobre os CEOs- Chief Executive Officers!

14th Annual Global CEO Survey

In the last quarter of 2010, we set out to uncover how are CEOs approaching growth, during a time when sustainable economic growth appeared far from assured. We surveyed 1,201 business leaders in 69 countries around the globe.

Further details in:

Trade Induced Technical Change? The Impact of Chinese Imports on Innovation, IT and Productivity

fevereiro 28, 2011

Muito se tem falado, e escrito, sobre o impacto da ascenção da China à categoria de potência econômica.  Mas pouco se tem analisado sobre o verdeiro impacto da China em questões relacionadas com inovação, tecnologias de informação e produtividade.

Eis que este hiato começa a ser preenchido.  Em mais um excelente artigo do National Bureau of Economic Research- NBER, dos EUA, tais questões são enfrentadas de forma competente!

Abaixo vai o resumo deste novo artigo!

Trade Induced Technical Change? The Impact of Chinese Imports on Innovation, IT and Productivity

Nicholas Bloom, Mirko Draca, John Van Reenen

NBER Working Paper No. 16717
Issued in January 2011
NBER Program(s):   EFG IO ITI LS PR

We examine the impact of Chinese import competition on patenting, IT, R&D and TFP using a panel of up to half a million firms over 1996-2007 across twelve European countries. We correct for endogeneity using the removal of product-specific quotas following China’s entry into the World Trade Organization. Chinese import competition had two effects: first, it led to increases in R&D, patenting, IT and TFP within firms; and second it reallocated employment between firms towards more innovative and technologically advanced firms. These within and between effects were about equal in magnitude, and appear to account for around 15% of European technology upgrading between 2000-2007. Rising Chinese import competition also led to falls in employment, profits, prices and the skill share. By contrast, import competition from developed countries had no effect on innovation. We develop a simple “trapped factor” model of innovation that is consistent with these empirical findings.

This paper is available as PDF (346 K) or via email.

O quê falta para as Tecnologias de Informação e Comunicação- TICs do Brasil “decolarem”? Parte 4 – Final

fevereiro 21, 2011

Saiu a newsletter da Creativante. É a última parte da série “O quê falta para as Tecnologias de Informação e Comunicação- TICs do Brasil “decolarem”? Parte 4 – Final “, que você pode acessar aqui!

How Convincing Is the Case for Free Trade?

fevereiro 20, 2011

Uma espécie de continuação do artigo do Prof. Mankiw, postado minutos atrás neste blog, foi feita pelo Prof.  Uwe E. Reinhardt no mesmo jornal americano!


February 18, 2011, 6:00 am
How Convincing Is the Case for Free Trade?


12:09 p.m. | Updated to enable comments, correcting a technical problem.

Today's Economist

Uwe E. Reinhardt is an economics professor at Princeton.

“Emerging Markets as Partners, Not Rivals,” a fine commentary in The New York Times on Sunday by N. Gregory Mankiw of Harvard prompted me to take a vacation from the dreariness of health policy to visit one of the economic profession’s intellectual triumphs: the theory that every country gains by unfettered international trade.

That theory is less popular among noneconomists, especially politicians and unions. They wring their hands at what is called offshoring of jobs and often have no problem obstructing free trade with such barriers as tariffs or import quotas, which they deem in the national interest. (Two blogs recently offered examples of this posture.)

In a well-known textbook by Professor Mankiw (Princeton class of ’80, I feel compelled to add) and in other textbooks as well, the benefits of free trade typically are explained with multicolored graphs that look like puzzles but, after some study, reveal this truth, which economists hold self-evident: Relative to a status quo of no or limited international trade, permitting full free trade across borders will leave in its wake some immediate losers, but citizens who gain from such trade gain much more than the losers lose. On a net basis, therefore, each nation gains over all from such trade.

Economists assert that over the longer run, the owners of businesses that lose their markets in international competition and their employees will shift into new economic endeavors in which they can function more competitively. Skeptics, of course, often respond with the retort of John Maynard Keynes: “In the long run, we’re all dead.”

In his recent commentary, Professor Mankiw explained the gains from trade even more simply than is done in textbooks. Your driveway is covered in deep snow. Its removal is worth $40 to you. The boy next door, currently engrossed with a game on his Xbox, would give up the game and shovel your driveway for any payment exceeding $20.

So if you pay him $30 to shovel your driveway, you will both be better off by $10. Overall social welfare is unambiguously enhanced.

Professor Mankiw then wrote:

This example is not so special as it might seem. The gains for trade would be much the same if your neighbor were manufacturing a good – knitting you a scarf, for example – rather than performing a service. And it would be much the same if, instead of living next door, he was several thousand miles away, say, in Shanghai.

As far as economists are concerned, how can anyone argue with that?

We can extend this neat example a bit. Suppose just as you are about to shake hands with the boy next door on the $30 deal, another boy from the neighborhood comes along and offers to shovel your driveway for $10. Elated at this bargain, you pay him $15. Now you are very much better off, and that other boy gains, too, because he would have done the job for $10. Social welfare seems enhanced here as well, most economists would say.

Not so, according to the first boy, who is sorely miffed at losing out in this competition. He loses his anticipated profit, known among economists as producers’ surplus — what he would have been paid to shovel the driveway minus the minimum payment he would have required to do that job.

Most Americans, however, probably would side here with economists, in the belief that all’s fair in love and economic warfare, and that this form of tough price competition is precisely what propels our economy forward.

Now let us think again about the manufactured scarves. Just as you were about to buy a scarf from your neighbor on the left for $50, your neighbor on the right, also a manufacturer of scarfs, offers you an identical scarf for $35. Economists would consider that fair and efficient as well – as, I am sure, would most Americans.

But many Americans might balk at the lower-priced scarf if it were offered not by an American but by a low-cost manufacturer in Shanghai or Bangladesh. This nationalist sentiment sets many noneconomists apart from most economists.

In their work, economists are typically are not nationalistic. National boundaries mean little to them, other than that much data happen to be collected on a national basis. Whether a fellow American gains from a trade or someone in Shanghai does not make any difference to most economists, nor does it matter to them where the losers from global competition live, in America or elsewhere.

I say most economists, because here and there one can find some who do seem to worry about how fellow Americans fare in the matter of free trade.

In a widely noted column in The Washington Post, “Free Trade’s Great, but Offshoring Rattles Me,” for example, my Princeton colleague Alan Blinder wrote:

I’m a free trader down to my toes. Always have been. Yet lately, I’m being treated as a heretic by many of my fellow economists. Why? Because I have stuck my neck out and predicted that the offshoring of service jobs from rich countries such as the United States to poor countries such as India may pose major problems for tens of millions of American workers over the coming decades. In fact, I think offshoring may be the biggest political issue in economics for a generation. When I say this, many of my fellow free traders react with a mixture of disbelief, pity and hostility. Blinder, have you lost your mind?

Professor Blinder has estimated that 30 million to 40 million jobs in the United States are potentially offshorable — including those of scientists, mathematicians, radiologists and editors on the high end of the market, and those of telephone operators, clerks and typists on the low end. He says he is rattled by the question of how our country will cope with this phenomenon, especially in view of our tattered social safety net.

“That is why I am going public with my concerns now,” he concludes. “If we economists stubbornly insist on chanting ‘free trade is good for you’ to people who know that it is not, we will quickly become irrelevant to the public debate. Compared with that, a little apostasy should be welcome.”

What do you think?

Emerging Markets as Partners, Not Rivals

fevereiro 20, 2011

Um interessante artigo do Prog. Greg Mankiw em sua coluna em The New York Times

Emerging Markets as Partners, Not Rivals

Published: February 12, 2011

IN his State of the Union address last month, President Obama set the stage for a coming policy debate and his re-election bid with a catch phrase. Six times, he called on Americans to “win the future.” And he used the variant “winning the future” three other times. But is this really a good way to frame the economic challenges we face?

David G. Klein

No doubt, the phrase appealed to White House political advisers and speechwriters. It is always better for presidents to focus on our future potential than the immutable past. And who doesn’t want to win? Americans love rooting for their favorite teams, and no contest seems more vital than that for international economic dominance.

Yet this catch phrase is also problematic. For one thing, “Winning the Future” was the title of a 2005 book by Newt Gingrich. It is almost as if Mr. Gingrich were to run for president in 2012 under the banner “Audacious Hope.” And then there is that pesky abbreviated form of the phrase — WTF — that does not exactly inspire confidence.

More troublesome to me as an economist, though, is that calling on Americans to “win the future” misleads us about the nature of the policy choices ahead. Achieving economic prosperity is not like winning a game, and guiding an economy is not like managing a sports team.

To see why, let’s start with a basic economic transaction. You have a driveway covered in snow and would be willing to pay $40 to have it shoveled. The boy next door can do it in two hours, or he can spend that time playing on his Xbox, an activity he values at $20. The solution is obvious: You offer him $30 to shovel your drive, and he happily agrees.

The key here is that everyone gains from trade. By buying something for $30 that you value at $40, you get $10 of what economists call “consumer surplus.” Similarly, your young neighbor gets $10 of “producer surplus,” because he earns $30 of income by incurring only $20 of cost. Unlike a sports contest, which by necessity has a winner and a loser, a voluntary economic transaction between consenting consumers and producers typically benefits both parties.

This example is not as special as it might seem. The gains from trade would be much the same if your neighbor were manufacturing a good — knitting you a scarf, for example — rather than performing a service. And it would be much the same if, instead of living next door, he was several thousand miles away, say, in Shanghai.

Listening to the president, you might think that competition from China and other rapidly growing nations was one of the larger threats facing the United States. But the essence of economic exchange belies that description. Other nations are best viewed not as our competitors but as our trading partners. Partners are to be welcomed, not feared. As a general matter, their prosperity does not come at our expense.

To be sure, there are exceptions to this rule. When China uses our intellectual property such as software without paying for it, we should view that as a form of theft. And when other nations’ economic growth has side effects on the global environment, as it does when they emit the greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change, the United States has good reason for concern. But these limited exceptions should not blind us into taking a more generally adversarial approach to international economic relations.

During the address, Mr. Obama lamented the fact that many foreign students attended colleges and universities in the United States and then returned to their countries of origin. “As soon as they obtain advanced degrees, we send them back home to compete against us,” he said. “It makes no sense.”

The president is right that we should encourage a greater number of highly educated foreigners to migrate here. Because skilled workers pay more in taxes than they receive in government benefits, increasing their supply would reduce the fiscal burden on the rest of us. But if these foreign students decide to return home, as many do, we shouldn’t worry that they are competing against us.

Instead, we should view higher education in the United States as one of our most successful export industries. The United States has 5 percent of the world’s population but most of the best universities. Is it any wonder that students from many nations flock here to learn? And as they do so, they create opportunities for Americans — from the professors who teach the classes to the grounds crews who maintain the campuses.

When the foreign students head home, they take the human capital acquired here to become productive members of their own communities. They spread up-to-date knowledge, so it can foster prosperity everywhere. Some of this knowledge is technological. Some of it concerns business, legal and medical practices. And some is even more fundamental, such as the values of democracy and individual liberty. Nothing could be better for the United States than these thousands of American-trained ambassadors who have seen at first hand the benefits of a free and open society.

As we confront the many hard policy choices ahead, let’s prepare for the future. Let’s invest for the future. Let’s be willing to make hard sacrifices for a more prosperous future. But let’s not presume that the future is a game requiring winners and losers.

N. Gregory Mankiw is a professor of economics at Harvard. He was an adviser to President George W. Bush.

Why Are Saving Rates so High in China?

fevereiro 15, 2011

O debate recente acerca do crescimento econômico brasileiro (crescimento traduzido pela sua mediocridade desde os anos 80, ou pela sua insustentabilidade) quase sempre esteve associado à baixa capacidade de poupar dos brasileiros; ou seja, baixa capacidade de poupar, baixa capacidade de investir, e consequente baixo crescimento econômico.

Um contraponto a isto tem sido o modelo chinês, cujas altas taxas de crescimento são sempre associadas às suas altas taxas de poupança.  Frequentemente nós economistas dizemos que os chineses poupam muito porque eles não têm a rede social de proteção que nós construimos ao longo dos últimos 20 e poucos anos.

Mas agora os números e as explicações para a pujança do crescimento econômico chinês começam a ficar mais claros. E é o que indica um recente paper do National Bureau of Economic Research- NBER dos EUA, cujo resumo segue abaixo.

Why Are Saving Rates so High in China?

Dennis Tao Yang, Junsen Zhang, Shaojie Zhou

NBER Working Paper No. 16771
Issued in February 2011
NBER Program(s):   EFG

In this paper, we define “The Chinese Saving Puzzle” as the persistently high national saving rate at 34–53 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the past three decades and a surge in the saving rate by 11 percentage points from 2000–2008. Using data from the Flow of Funds Accounts (FFA) and Urban Household Surveys (UHS) supplemented by the findings from existing studies, we analyze the sources and causes of China’s high and rising saving rates in the government, corporate, and household sectors. Although the causes of China’s high saving are complex, we suggest that the evolving economic, demographic, and policy trends in the internal and external environments of the Chinese economy will likely lead to a decline in national saving in the foreseeable future.

This paper is available as PDF (212 K) or via email.

The Heckman Equation

fevereiro 15, 2011

Eu já tratei sobre isto neste blog em 2007 (ver, mas vale a pena bater mais uma vez nesta tecla.

Investir em capital humano na pré-infância é o investimento que pode dar o maior retorno social.  É o que aponta a Equação de Heckman, desenvolvida pelo Prof. James Heckman, Prêmio Nobel de Economia de 2000.

E para conchecer a Equação de Heckman (The Heckman Equation) basta uma visita aos slides que ele produziu no seu site:

O quê falta para as Tecnologias de Informação e Comunicação – TICs do Brasil “decolarem”? Parte 3

fevereiro 14, 2011

Saiu a mais nova newsletter da Creativante!

Ela é a Parte 3 da série “O quê falta para as Tecnologias de Informação e Comunicação – TICs do Brasil “decolarem”?, e você pode acessá-la aqui!

The Service Sector as India’s Road to Economic Growth

fevereiro 13, 2011

A economia da India, à medida que vai crescendo, vai se tornando complexa. É o que aparentemente se depreende deste novo artigo do National Bureau of Economic Research- NBER dos EUA.


The Service Sector as India’s Road to Economic Growth
Barry Eichengreen, Poonam Gupta

NBER Working Paper No. 16757
Issued in February 2011
NBER Program(s):   IFM

While India is distinctive among developing countries for its fast-growing service sector, sceptics have raised doubts about the quality and sustainability of this service-sector growth and its implications for economic development. We show, consistent with the views of the sceptics, that while growth of the sector has been unusually rapid, it started 15 years ago from unusually low levels. That the share of services has now simply converged to the international norm raises questions about whether it will continue growing rapidly. In particular, whether service-sector output and employment continue to grow in excess of international norms will depend on the continued expansion of modern services (business services, communication and banking) but, also, on the application of modern information technology to more traditional services (retail and wholesale trade, transport and storage, public administration and defense ). The second aspect obviously has more positive implications for output than for employment.

We also show that the modern services that are growing most rapidly are now large enough where their future performance could have a significant macroeconomic impact. The expansion of modern service-sector employment is not simply disguised manufacturing activity. Finally, we show that the mix of skilled and unskilled labor in manufacturing and services is increasingly similar. It is no longer obvious therefore that manufacturing is the main destination for the vast majority of Indian labor moving into the modern sector and that modern services are a viable destination only for the highly-skilled few. We conclude that sustaining economic growth and raising living standards will require shifting labor into both manufacturing and services.

This paper is available as PDF (1092 K) or via email.

Manufacturing Output, Top 8 Countries

fevereiro 8, 2011

Mais um da série “E depois dizem que os EUA vão mal!”!  Novamente, do blog do Prof. Mark Perry, de 05/02/2011 (!


Made in the USA


From Jeff Jacoby’s column in today’s Boston Globe “Made in the USA“:

“There’s just one problem with all the gloom and doom about American manufacturing. It’s wrong.

Americans make more “stuff’’ than any other nation on earth, and by a wide margin. According to the United Nations’ comprehensive database of international economic data, America’s manufacturing output in 2009 (expressed in constant 2005 dollars) was $2.15 trillion. That surpassed China’s output of $1.48 trillion by nearly 46 percent (see chart above). China’s industries may be booming, but the United States still accounted for 20 percent of the world’s manufacturing output in 2009 — only a hair below its 1990 share of 21 percent.

Perceptions also feed the gloom and doom. In its story on Americans’ economic anxiety, National Journal quotes a Florida teacher who says, “It seems like everything I pick up says ‘Made in China’ on it.’’ To someone shopping for toys, shoes, or sporting equipment, it often can seem that way. But that’s because Chinese factories tend to specialize in low-tech, labor-intensive goods — items that typically don’t require the more advanced and sophisticated manufacturing capabilities of modern American plants.
A vast amount of “stuff’’ is still made in the USA, albeit not the inexpensive consumer goods that fill the shelves in Target or Walgreens. American factories make fighter jets and air conditioners, automobiles and pharmaceuticals, industrial lathes and semiconductors. Not the sort of things on your weekly shopping list? Maybe not. But that doesn’t change economic reality. They may have “closed down the textile mill across the railroad tracks.’’ But America’s manufacturing glory is far from a thing of the past.”

Update: The chart above was prepared using the United Nations data on international GDP, including a breakout for manufacturing output, on an annual basis for most countries in the world from 1970-2009.  For most advanced countries, manufacturing data are provided for both: a) manufacturing, and b) total manufacturing including mining and utilities.  Total manufacturing would be a measure consistent with the Federal Reserve’s (and other countries’) measure of monthly “industrial production,” which is for total manufacturing output including mining and manufacturing.  For China, the only measure available from the UN is for total manufacturing, including mining and utilities.  Therefore, the only way to compare manufacturing output in China to the U.S. and other countries using the UN data is to use the measure of total manufacturing (including mining and utilities).

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