Archive for 8 de outubro de 2009

Capital market theory after the efficient market hypothesis

outubro 8, 2009

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Capital market theory after the efficient market hypothesis

Dimitri Vayanos   Paul Woolley
5 October 2009
 
Have capital market booms and crashes discredited the efficient market hypothesis? This column says yes and suggests a new model that explains asset pricing in terms of a battle between fair value and momentum driven by principal-agent issues. Investment agents’ rational profit seeking gives rise to mispricing and volatility.

Forty years have passed since the principles of classical economics were first applied formally to finance through the contributions of Eugene Fama (1970) and his now-renowned fellow academics. Over the intervening years, capital market theory and the efficient market hypothesis have been developed and modified to form an elegant and comprehensive framework for understanding asset pricing and risk.

But events have dealt a cruel blow to these theories, as John Authers argued in his recent FT column. Capital market booms and crashes, culminating in the latest sorry and socially costly crisis, have discredited the idea that markets are efficient and that prices reflect fair value.

Some economists still insist these events are simply the lively interplay of broadly efficient markets and see no cause to abandon the prevailing wisdom. Other commentators, including a number of leading economists, have proclaimed the death of mainstream finance theory and all that goes with it, especially the efficient market hypothesis, rational expectations, and mathematical modelling. The way forward, they argue, is to understand finance based on behavioural models on the grounds that psychological biases and irrational urges better explain the erratic performance of asset prices and capital markets. Presented this way, the choice seems stark and unsettling, and there is no doubt that the academic interpretation of finance is at a critical juncture.

The need for a science-based, unified theory of finance

At stake is the need for a scientifically based, unified theory of finance that is rigorous and tractable; one that retains as much as possible of the existing analytical framework and simultaneously produces credible explanations and predictions. This is no storm in an academic teacup. On the contrary, the implications for growth, wealth and society cannot be overstated. The efficient market hypothesis has beguiled policymakers into believing that market prices could be trusted and that bubbles either did not exist, were positively beneficial for growth, or could not be spotted. Intervention was therefore unnecessary, and regulation could be light-touch. By contrast, a theory of asset pricing that did a good job of explaining mispricing would provide policymakers with a stronger rationale for intervention and more scepticism about mark-to-market, index-tracking, and derivative pricing, to name but a few examples.

Principal-agent investment problems: Mispricing with rationality

 

We believe that a first step in the search for a new paradigm is to avoid the mistake of jumping from observing that prices are inefficient to believing that investors must be irrational, or that it is impossible to construct a valid theory of asset pricing based on rational behaviour. Finance theory has combined rationality with other assumptions, and it is one of these other assumptions that has proved unfit for purpose. The crucial flaw has been to assume that prices are set by the army of private investors, the “representative household” as the jargon has it. Households are assumed to invest directly in equities and bonds and across the spectrum of the derivatives markets. Theory has ignored the real world complication that investors delegate virtually all their involvement in financial matters to professional intermediaries – banks, fund managers, brokers – who dominate the pricing process.

Delegation creates an agency problem. Agents have more and better information than the investors who appoint them, and the interests of the two are rarely aligned. For their part, principals cannot be certain of the competence or diligence of their appointed agents. The agency problem has been acknowledged in corporate finance and banking but hardly at all in asset pricing. Introducing agents brings greater realism to asset-pricing models and can be shown to transform the analysis and output. Importantly, this is achieved whilst maintaining the assumption of fully rational behaviour on the part of all concerned. Such models have more working parts and therefore a higher level of complexity, but the effort is richly rewarded by the scope and relevance of the predictions.

By doing this in our recent paper (Vayanos and Woolley, 2008), we have been able to explain momentum, the commonly observed propensity for trending in prices, which in extreme form causes bubbles and crashes. Momentum is incompatible with an efficient market and has proved difficult to explain in the traditional framework. Indeed, it has been described by Fama and French (1993) as the “premier unexplained anomaly” in asset pricing. Central to the analysis is that investors have imperfect knowledge of the ability of the fund managers they invest with. They are uncertain whether underperformance against the benchmark arises from the manager’s prudent avoidance of over-priced stocks or is a sign of incompetence. As shortfalls grow, investors conclude incompetence and react by transferring funds to the outperforming managers, thereby amplifying the price changes that led to the initial underperformance and generating momentum.1

The dot-com boom

The technology bubble ten years ago illustrates this well. Technology stocks received an initial boost from fanciful expectations of future profits from scientific advance. Meanwhile, funds invested in the unglamorous, value sectors languished, prompting investors to lose confidence in the ability of their underperforming value managers and switch funds to the newly successful growth managers, a response which gave a further boost to growth stocks. The same thing happened as value managers themselves began switching from value to growth stocks to avoid being fired.

Through this conceptually simple mechanism, the model explains asset pricing in terms of a battle between fair value and momentum. It shows how rational profit seeking by agents and the investors who appoint them gives rise to mispricing and volatility. Once momentum becomes embedded in markets, agents then logically respond by adopting strategies that are likely to reinforce the trends. Explaining the formation of asset pricing in this way seems to provide a clearer understanding of how and why investors and prices behave as they do. For example, it throws fresh light on why value stocks generally outperform growth stocks despite offering seemingly poorer earnings prospects. The new approach offers a more convincing interpretation of the way stock prices react to earnings announcements or other news. It also shows how short-term incentives, such as annual performance fees, cause fund managers to concentrate on high-turnover, trend-following strategies that add to the distortions in markets, which are then profitably exploited by long-horizon investors. At the level of national markets and entire asset classes, it will no longer be acceptable to say that competition delivers the right price or that the market exerts self-discipline.

More micro modelling of the financial sector

It seems self-evident that the way forward must be to stop treating the finance sector as a pass-through that has no impact on asset pricing and risk. Incorporating delegation and agency into financial models is bound to lead to a better understanding of phenomena that have so far been poorly understood or unaddressed. Because the new approach maintains the rationality assumption, it makes it possible to retain much of the economist’s existing toolbox, such as mathematical modelling, utility maximisation and general equilibrium reasoning. The insights, elegance, and tractability that these tools provide will be used to study more complex phenomena with very different economic assumptions. The new general theory of asset pricing that eventually emerges should relegate the efficient market hypothesis to the status of special and limiting case.

Concluding remarks

Of course, investors may not always behave in a perfectly rational way. But that is beside the point. If this new approach meets the criteria of relevance, validity, and universality required of any new theory, then it provides a valuable starting point in understanding markets. Models based on irrational behaviour can always be helpful in offering supplementary or more detailed insights. 

The impact of the new general theory will extend well beyond explaining asset prices and investors’ actions.

  • Corporate finance and banking theory have both been developed under the pro-forma assumption of price efficiency and will now need to accommodate systematic mispricing.
  • Macroeconomics has also treated finance as a pass-through and would benefit from changing the economic emphasis and focusing more on the impact of agency and incentives in the savings and investment process. 
  • In the context of the recent crisis, governments and regulators can only rebuild and re-regulate banking and finance successfully if they have a better idea of how crises form.
  • Finally, economists may start to ask questions about the social value of the finance sector, its size, and complexity – questions that could be conveniently brushed under the carpet given the prevailing paradigm of efficiency.

References 

Fama, Eugene F. (1970), “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 25, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association

Fama, Eugene F. and Kenneth R. French,Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds,” Journal of Financial Economics, 1993.

Vayanos and Woolley (2008), “An Institutional Theory of Momentum and Reversal,” The Paul Woolley Centre for the Study of Capital Market Dysfunctionality, Working Paper Series No.1.


 

1. We show that as long as fund flows are gradual, as in the real world, price changes are also gradual. Intuitively, rational long-term investors are eager to buy an undervalued stock even when the stock is expected to become more undervalued in the future because of the risk that undervaluation might instead disappear. We term this the “bird in the hand” effect.

 

 

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Is Google The Next Microsoft?

outubro 8, 2009

 

Do blog http://testfunda.com!

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Is Google The Next Microsoft?

Reporter- 07 October 2009

google
Apple recently rejected the Google Voice application from Google for its iPhone on the grounds that the app fundamentally changed the look and feel of the iPhone’s unique interface. In short, Apple has begun to worry that Google is now set to invade its space with what has now become a common strategy – offering free software or applications to users.

Increasingly, Google is being seen as the Microsoft of the new millennium. From its humble beginnings as a search engine, Google now spans a number of areas including social networking, office productivity tools and ebooks. With the Android mobile platform, Google has already invaded the mobile platform. And in ways reminiscent of Microsoft in the 80’s, it is now fast becoming the standard in a number of these areas. Google next plans to launch its own operating system, which will take it to the pinnacle point in terms of software development for the consumer space. No wonder that Apple feels threatened.

In many ways, Google resembles the Microsoft of old. However, to ensure it does not run afoul of the regulators as Microsoft did, it will have to learn the lessons of Microsoft fast. Google today is of a size where it has few competitors. In fact, it is in a position to up root any competition that emerges in a market where Google dominates. However, any attempt to do so will create the same kind of negative backlash that Microsoft generated when it went after Netscape’s Navigator browser.  

Microsoft was involved in years of litigation with the government over the violation of antitrust laws (essentially laws that prevent monopolies and unhealthy competition in the US). Google seems to be under threat of going the same way, with its free browser, free operating systems for mobile and netbooks, and the free office productivity suite it offers to customers gaining marketshare rapidly. In fact, the Google Docs online application brought the company in direct conflict with Microsoft whose Office Suite has dominated the productivity market for years.

Apple has been added to the competition recently, and this is definitely cause for worry for the maverick company that is itself known for challenging mainstream perceptions through innovation. Researchers estimate that Google will continue to focus on the mobile platform as that is the new growth segment which it cannot ignore for its search application. The segment of mobile platform browsing has seen tremendous growth and will continue to do so as speeds pick up. Consumers are becoming more accustomed to using their smartphones to access real time information and even pay for purchases, hence the fight to dominate the sector.

The reason Google is so focused on garnering marketshare is the lucrative search advertising model on which its search engine thrives. The company will continue to get into any market where it feels it can apply the business model successfully. With T-mobile and Motorola launching Android based phones; the base of operations in the mobile space is now established. T-mobile’s G1 phones powered by Android have in fact sold over a million units already.

But it is the dominance of the search market that could spell trouble for Google as it could wipe out any competitor due to its revenues and dominance in search. So strong is its presence that Microsoft had to tie up with Yahoo to offer a competing search platform, called Bing. This is one credible challenge that Google could face.

Google is slowly becoming an information behemoth. It will have to face concerns of data security and management as it keeps growing. The day is not far when Google will know the kind of mail you receive, the content you browse and the places you shop online. That is a scary thought, as Google turns into the modern day version of George Orwell’s central figure Big Brother, in the novel 1984.

http://www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=viewfeature&id=1768&language=english


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